>>> Posting number 2399, dated 16 Jul 1997 21:05:30 Date: Wed, 16 Jul 1997 21:05:30 -0400 Reply-To: Discussion of Fraud in Science Sender: Discussion of Fraud in Science From: Al Higgins Organization: Sociology Department, CAS, UAlbany Subject: Reply to Jim Whitehead MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Jim Whitehead, You ask about the cases of professors "abusing" graduate students and, thereby, winning the Nobel. When I did the posting on "The Stff of Myth?," I was thinking, as Gregory Hennessy recognized clearly, of the treatment of J. Bell by A. Hewish as well as the treatment of H. Fletcher by R. A. Millikan. I searched the Scifraud database and, after eliminating a few hits that were irrelevant to the present issue, I post the following annotations from that database: ++++++++++ \Wade, Nicholas. "Discovery of Pulsars: A Graduate Student's Story," Science 189 (August, 1975), pp. 358-364.\ Here is a fascinating case involving a bureaucratic question: when the laboratory director sets a graduate student to a task and the student, as a direct result of following orders, finds something truly remarkable, who deserves the credit? The director administers the lab, raises the money, supplies the equipment, sets the student to work, pays the student's salary, and even awards the student a degree. However, the student "sees" that special something there and calls the director's attention to it. The Nobel prize was awarded to Anthony Hewish and not to the graduate student, Jocelyn Bell Burnell. She has now accepted other awards for her contribution to the discovery of pulsars, and she does not feel that she was mistreated in not sharing in the Nobel. The fact is that this is a sort of "grey" area in which the ethics of the situation are unclear. Who deserves what portion of the total credit is never an easy question to answer. In this day of Big Science, Nobel's assumption that discoveries are made by geniuses is somewhat dated. Big science does not operate his way, and teams are the usual locus of major discoveries. I must wonder, too, if ethical abstractions could ever be meaningful, given the enormous complexities of Big Science. It is fairly easy to condemn Hewish. It is an open secret that many in the profession feel that Burnell was treated badly. I would emphasize that the graduate student/professor relationship is one with certain benefits for graduate students. By cooperating in a joint study, the student is assured of income, given a task which is to be accepted as professionally rewarding, given a thesis project, given the data, given a place to work, a phone, computer, secretarial assistance, etc. In return, the student who helps the master can, in fact, expect that the master will continue to look out for him/her. When it comes to finding a position, a patron is a good person to know. When it comes to writing letters of recommendation... When it comes to the Old Boy networks through which so many jobs are landed... And then there is the possibility of a continuing long-term relationship, with favorable recommendations on grant applications... ++++++++++ \Woolgar, S. W. "Writing an Intellectual History of Scientific Development: The Use of Discovery Accounts," Social Studies of Science 6 (September, 1976), pp. 395-422.\ This is a reference for many things: 1) it is a methods paper dealing with the adequacy of diverse accounts of the discovery process and, as such, it is a useful effort to determine just how the whole cloth of discovery gets woven; and 2) it is a "controversial" episode which Woolgar has chosen to study: the discovery of pulsars, with the lab director Anthony Hewish getting the Nobel prize for pulsars, while his graduate student (who did the actual work) only got her degree. Interestingly enough, the author suggests that the discovery accounts are not terribly useful in investigating "discoveries." Discovery tales are fabricated after the event in an effort to make the process seem to have been logical and the result of good Baconian methods. Actually, historians can write their histories differently and there is no standard against which their tales can be compared. There is no logic to the discovery process. If there were, discovery would not be so rare. The pulsars are there and they were not there before, but that is not due to the work of Bell and Hewish; that is due to the recognition that pulsars are there. One would really have to study the process by means of which Hewish convinced other astronomers that pulsars exist. Of course, that is not a part of the myth of discovery. ++++++++++ \Boffey, Philip M. "Science Nobels: Do They Always Go to the Best?" New York Times, 18 October 1983, pp. C1, C2.\ It is the Nobel season and it is not inappropriate that amid the fuss and the furor of celebrating American Achievements, there should be some questions raised about the prizes themselves. "Do the prizes always go to the best?" could be be followed by, "Have mistakes been made?" Could it be in science that the good guy does not always win? Here is a Times' staffer describing some of the stuff that has gone on in the past. The references he uses include Zuckerman. He also uses Donald Fleming, described as an historian of science at Harvard. How one decides to look at this is determining of what one is going to find; ask a science loyalist and the answers are loyal. Nobel severely limited science by his definition. There is no award in mathematics (because Nobel hated the leading mathematician of his day?) and none in astronomy, none in evolutionary biology, agriculture, geophysics, meteorology, to say nothing of more recent arrivals like computer science and ecology. Moreover, the prizes in Economics, Peace, and Literature are frequently politicized. There are also other kinds of mistakes: Hewish got the prize while his graduate student, Jocelyn Bell, did not; Macleod and Banting won in medicine when they should not have; Fibiger won the prize in medicine in 1926 for work on cancer, which later turned out to be mistaken; and, while Einstein did win a prize, it was not for his theory of relativity. This author also complains that Freud did not win a prize. (That is, of course, a matter on which there might be some disagreement.) Zuckerman and Fleming agree that the awards may not be beneficial to the recipients. Winners play at being laureates and forget to work. But even if, as Zuckerman suggests, the productivity of the individual scientist seems to fade after a win, the competition for the prizes does stimulate scientific research. The implication here is that the competition has its costs which are not borne by the Institute. It is here reported that the Swedes have tried to broaden the base of prizes by offering the less endowed Crawford prize, which is worth only $50,000. This will be open in those areas not covered by Nobel's will. ++++++++++ \Broad, William and Wade, Nicholas. Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.\ This is a wonderful book and a beautiful job of reporting. The authors spell out their approach clearly and early. They start by saying that the conventional wisdom about science is too misleading to be used in describing science as it really is. Therefore, "Fraud, we believe, offers another route to understanding science. Medicine, after all, has derived much useful knowledge about the normal functioning of the body from the study of pathology. By studying science through its pathology rather than through some preconceived criterion, it is easier to see the process as it is, as distinct from how it ought to be. Cases of fraud provide telling evidence not just about how well the checking systems of science work in practice, but also about the fundamental nature of science--about the scientific method, about the relation of fact to theory, about the motives and attitudes of scientists. This book presents an analysis of what can be seen of science from the perspective of scientific fraud." (p. 8) By the second chapter, they are into the history of fraud in science. It is a familiar trail which centers on Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton, Dalton, Mendel and Millikan. They tell these tales well, with several useful quotes. One kind of fraud which they identify is "careerism," the substitution of "professionalism" for the goals of science, the advancement of self through the abuse of science. They go on to provide clear examples. The first is of Alsabti, who illustrates the point well: he knew how to work the system and work it he did. There is an additional tale of academic careerism: James H. McCrocklin, an erstwhile college president who faked his way through academe. Another myth in science which the authors identify is the failure of replication to control fraud. Replication, they insist does not work in the way science assumes it should work, and for a very simple reason: the suggestion that replication is to be attempted is an implied and/or overt threat. It is the suggestion that the researcher is not believed. The case in point is that of Marc Spector and his mentor, Efraim Racker, of Cornell. Spector could do things in a laboratory that nobody else could do; he was supposed to have magic fingers. If one could not replicate his work it was because one was not doing it correctly. Furthermore, Racker, who was a Big Name, had vouched for the work the young man was doing. Finally, Racker was having his own pet theory proven by Spector's work and was most unwilling to "check out" confirming evidence. "The notion of replication, in the sense of repeating an experiment in order to test its validity, is a myth, a theoretical construct dreamed up by the philosophers and sociologists of science." (p. 77) The authors have a section in this chapter on replication which merits special mention. They point out that when research is routinely replicated, as is work done for the FDA and EPA, the discovery of cheating increases about 10 per cent. This is to say that when checks are routinely imposed, a lot more fraud is uncovered. The appropriate quote is, "...perhaps as many as 10 percent do something less than honest research." (p. 83) It is not until page 87 that the authors reach this startling guesstimate of cheating in science "...(our estimates) would indicate that every major case of fraud that becomes publicis the representative of some 100,000 others...that lie concealed in the marshy wastes of the scientific literature." I do not understand why they felt they had to come up with some sort of number. As it stands, it is meaningless save as a sort of a catchy quote. They then focus on the scientific elite for another kind of fraud. The case of John Long is illustrative. He was a rising star in a big hospital, doing big things. And then he had the whistle blown on him. For a long time, however, his position saved him. Another example of this elitism is the case of Noguchi at the Rockerfeller Institute, whose friendship with Simon Flexner seemed to make him immune to criticism. The crime of self-deception is mentioned and the examples given include the cases of Clever Hans, Rene Blondlot, the Piltdown forgery, and the profession's cruel blindness to Ignatz Semmelweiss. The mentor-professor relationship is shown to be a tricky one which is frequently abused. (Though Broad and Wade do not mention it in their book, the student can frequently benefit enormously by allowing his mentor to steal his ideas.) Some cases of abused students include: Hewish's winning the Nobel Prize for the discovery of pulsars and he didn't do the work. He was director of the laboratory in which the work was done. The question: What are the rights and responsibilities of the administrator of a large scientific project? The master-apprentice relationship seems to be central to the frauds of Summerlin, Guillis, and John Darsee. These men got away with fraud as long as they did because of their contacts with Big Name scientists. (Broad and Wade do not mention that in the Summerlin affair, his mentor at Sloan-Kettering was among the accusers.) To tie up this section, the authors discuss the Soman-Filig affair. The next sin in science is that of "politicalization," wherein the sacred garb of science enwraps the garbage of the partly disguised ideologist. This was the problem with Lysenko and what passed for Russian agronomy under his years in power. Strangely enough, the authors include the Paul Kammerer case here. They conclude: "There exist clear limits to the ability of the scientific method to resist encroachment by nonscientific ideologies." (p. 191) The failure of objectivity is exemplified in Samuel G. Morton. The authors' source on Morton is Gould, and they mention "The Finagle Factor" as well as the Science article. Also they quote from Gould's Mismeasure of Man. However, they stick tociting the materials on Morton, ignoring Gould's insistence that all of psychology and certainly a large number of psychologists could be used to exemplify the loss of objectivity through a commitment to a pet hypothesis. Consider their awareness that "...psychologists used the massive test results (of WWI) to bolster their own claims for the technique." (p. 200) But they let it go at that. Clearly, this is not an attack on psychologists. Cyril Burt is handled in the same way, as exemplifying a loss of objectivity. "Science is not self-policing. Scholars do not always read the scientific literature carefully. Science is not a perfectly objective process. Dogma and prejudice, when suitably garbed, creep into science just as easily as into any other human enterprise, and maybe more easily since their entry is unexpected. Burt, with the mere appearance of being a scientist, worked his way to the top of the academic ladder, to a position of power and influence in both science and the world beyond. He used the scientific method as a purely rhetorical tool to force the acceptance of his own dogmatic ideas. Against such weapons, the scientific community that harbored him was defenseless." (p. 211) The book ends with "Fraud and the Structure of Science," in which the authors try to sum up. The chapter is much the same as Broad's article, (same title), which appeared in Science. I like this analogy: just as Adam Smith had economics ultimately operated by an Invisible Hand, so would this describe the ideological view of science as operating with an Invisible Boot, which is supposed to kick out the rascals and the rotten apples along with their evil data. The last pages of the book provide a very brief picture of cheating in science by listing 34 cases which the authors know about and report on in the text of the book. It is a sort of rogue's gallery of science. ++++++++++ \Fletcher, Harvey, "My Work With Millikan on the Oil-Drop Experiment," Physics Today 35 (June, 1982), pp. 43-47.\ This paper was referenced in Broad and Wade's Betrayers... It could have several different headings in this bibliography: the chela-guru relationship; getting even with the boss; and in history, how important are graduate students in research? This is a personal memoir written by Fletcher. It was written with instructions not to publish it until after his death. He suggests that it not be published until then because he wants it clear that he had, after death, nothing to gain from the publication. (However, he did write it with an eye to history and I find the disclaimer a bit disingenuous). The paper does make it appear that Millikan had a great debt to Fletcher and it also makes it appear that in spite of Millikan's great generosity in seeing to it that Fletcher had money as a graduate student (and for that matter even getting him into the physics program at Chicago), and seeing to it that he got a good job after graduating summa cum laude, it was not enough. In spite of the disclaimer, the only reason to publish a piece like this is to get even. Fletcher didn't get a share of the Nobel prize. At the end of the article, in the last two paragraphs, the author has it that there were rumors around Chicago that Millikan was in debt to Fletcher. The author says that he is aware of these persistent rumors and is writing this personal piece to put those rumors to rest. Quite clearly, this piece confirms the worst suspicions: Millikan had been less than completely open with Fletcher in demanding exclusive authorship of the first of their jointly written five articles. Fletcher goes on to suggest that it was for the initial paper, the one with the exclusive author, that got Millikan got the Nobel prize. Further, Millikan was at the least being selfish in not sharing the Nobel prize with his erstwhile collaborator. I should point out that what Fletcher did was design the oil-drop experiment and work with Millikan for the years in which the measurements were made. The important part: Fletcher claims to have designed the apparatus in a single afternoon and has it that while other people may have improved on the device, the thing was essentially his contribution. ++++++++++ \Millikan, Robert A. Autobiography. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950.\ Millikan appears in several places and for several different reasons in this bibliography. This reference is included to specify his contribution to the ideology of science. He is a major contributor to that ideology. He more than any other scientist in the early part of this century created the image of science in this country. He is the personification of American science: the small town mid-Westerner who, through education and hard work, attained the status of advisor to presidents and chief executive of the most prestigious technology institute in the world. On some particulars: H. Fletcher was the graduate student who worked with Millikan, claimed to have given Millikan the idea of the oil-drop, and to have been shafted by Millikan when it came to the Nobel prize. Millikan mentions Fletcher on only one page of this book and describes him as a graduate student. Obviously, Millikan disagrees with Fletcher's statement that he "owed" Fletcher. Millikan admits "playing" with oil-drops for years. The droplets were beautiful and fun to watch. He played with them undoubtedly to the extent that he "knew" which drops were behaving normally and which abnormally. He did not feel it possible to describe the "feelings" he had for an experiment of this kind. That would be like a welder trying to describe his craft. It cannot be described, it can only be done. Quite clearly, I believe Millikan. He didn't fudge his data. He just had become a craftsman. Millikan sees science very selectively. He benefited enormously from Big Business (ATT, for example) and so he has only praiseworthy things to say about ATT, how competent it is and how nice its lawyers are. (see pages 112-113) There are other Big Names too: Carnegie and Rockefeller are spread throughout the book. Thus, in rebuilding Cal-Tech in the 1920's, "The Carnegie Corporation has put into Caltech at least $1,000,000 and the Rockefeller Foundation has had enough confidence in its projects to support them to the extent of at least $5,000,000 devoted to the 200-inch (Mt. Polomar) telescope." (p. 250) Education is thus financed by the same sources over and over again. It is in the final chapter of the book, "The Two Supreme Elements in Human Progress," (pp. 279-288) that Millikan states his ideological position most clearly: the two elements of his title are religion and science. They are the joint pillars on which the arch of progress is, and must be, erected. "Religion" he suggests, "is world loyalty." (p. 282) The scientist, too, is characterized by this same attitude. He searchs for truth and "the combination of science and religion, that provides today the sole basis for rational intelligent living." (p. 285) It is a dated work. Millikan was a relatively old man when he wrote it. It mentions a One-World sort of thinking that was fashionable among mid-Westerners at mid-century but which is dead now. I can understand why critics condemn this book. ++++++++++ \Kevles, Daniel J. "Robert A. Millikan," Scientific American 240 (June 1979), pp. 142-151.\ Here is another telling of the career of Robert A. Millikan. Here the treatment has nothing to do with his dealings with Fletcher, his erstwhile assistant, or with fudging with data. Rather, emphasized here are the later controversies in Millikan's life: cosmic rays and the mistrust Millikan felt for federal control of science. In fact, far from crediting Fletcher for the oil-drop idea, this author suggests that the idea came from H. A. Wilson, but no other data are provided. I note that Millikan was not the first American citizen to win a Nobel prize in physics. Michelson was. But Michelson was born in Russia and Millikan was the first native-born winner of the prize. It would seem that Millikan was something of a headline hunter and self-promoter. "...(H)e was an avid publicist, one of the best in the scientific community. Articles by or about him were published frequently in both the local and national press. Radio listeners heard him discourse in his Yankee-sounding twang on the New Deal or the new physics. Irreverent Cal Tech faculty members spoke of the 'mill-kan' as one thousandth of a unit of publicity." (pp. 149-159) A staunch conservative, Millikan opposed the growth of federal intrusion in science generally and the National Science Foundation specifically. He did not want to see science politicized. This author describes Millikan's biography as a very skimpy document which selectively focuses on Millikan's glory days and omits the fact that by the 1950's Millikan was very much out of step with the course of science and government. ++++++++++ A. C. Higgins SS 359 SUNYA Albany, New York 12222 ACH13@CNSVAX.Albany.edu Phone: (518) 442 - 4678; FAX: (518) 442 - 4936 SCIFRAUD@CNSIBM.Albany.edu ________________________________________________________________ A. C. Higgins ACH13@louise.csbs.albany.edu College of Arts and Sciences VOX: 518-442-4678 Sociology Department FAX: 518-442-4936 University At Albany Albany, NY, USA 12222